Canals spawn dams ? Exploring the filiation of hydraulic infrastructure by Trottier, J. & Fernandez, S.
Canals spawn dams ? Exploring the filiation of hydraulic
infrastructure
J. Trottier, S. Fernandez
To cite this version:
J. Trottier, S. Fernandez. Canals spawn dams ? Exploring the filiation of hydraulic in-
frastructure. Environment and History, White Horse Press, 2010, 16 (1), p. 97 - p. 123.
<10.3197/096734010X485319>. <hal-00612900>
HAL Id: hal-00612900
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00612900
Submitted on 1 Aug 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Environment and History 16 (2010) : 00-00 
© 2010 The White Horse Press. doi: 
Canal Spawn Dams? 
Exploring the Filiation of Hydraulic Infrastructure  
JULIE TROTTIER 
CNRS, FRE 3017, ART-Dev 
Université Paul Valéry 
Route de Mende 
34199 Montpellier, Cedex 5 
FRANCE 
julie.trottier@univ-montp3.fr
 SARA FERNANDEZ  
Plan Bleu 
15 Rue Beethoven - Sophia Antipolis 
06560 Valbonne 
FRANCE 
sfernandez@planbleu.org
ABSTRACT 
This article studies the aetiology underlying water management by exploring the social 
hermeneutics that determined its construction. It details how science, technology and political 
relations construct each other mutually, both producing and harnessing the scientific discourse 
on the environment. Supply management continues to prevail, in spite of contradictory claims, 
through the filiation process linking successive generations of water infrastructure. The case 
study of the Neste Canal inducing the construction of the Charlas Dam, allows the 
identification of three types of mechanisms participating in the construction of water deficits 
that now lead both proponents and opponents of dam construction to harness the 
environmental discourse. The first lies in the social construction of water science and 
technology. The second lies in the evolution of power relations among the various actors. The 
third lies in the insertion of the ‘expert’ within these power relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The overexploitation and degradation of natural resources, especially water, is often attributed 
to population growth, climate change and inappropriate technology within a theoretical 
framework that portrays both problem and solution as technical and universal in relevance and 
application. The ‘tragedy of the commons’ with its vision of linear development and its 
ignorance of communal forms of social organisations, still structures the approach of much of 
the literature devoted to water management
1
. When turning to water, political scientists usually distinguish the scientists who are 
supposed to provide objective facts concerning it from political actors and activists who 
struggle to determine its control. This dichotomy is prevalent among French political 
scientists studying the environment in general.2  
Accounts of water development in France have been structured by this hypothetical 
dichotomy as authors have portrayed it up to the 1990s as a state led initiative where 
engineers, structured in corps, elaborated scientific solutions with hardly any interference 
from non-state actors. Such accounts have portrayed the discourse on public participation in 
water management as a novelty that arose only in the last twenty years, a time before which 
non state actors supposedly didn’t play a role in this domain.3
Political ecology emerged as a distinct field in the 1980s in response to the perceived 
apolitical nature of the mainstream literature on sustainable development4. The various 
approaches that came to be designated under this umbrella label initially focussed on 
developing world case studies and often emphasized aspects of environmental justice. 
Recently, attempts have been made to combine a political ecology approach with that 
developed by the sociology of scientific knowledge when examining environmental debates. 
Such a combined approach focuses on environmental discourses and environmental activism 
as hybrid objects without supposing ‘scientific facts’ to provide a pre-established, objective 
basis for the debate, but rather treating them as social constructs5. Forsyth, for example, 
argues that the political struggles and debates do not occur once the objective facts have been 
established by the scientists. Both the political struggle and the production of the scientific 
discourse and technology are deeply enmeshed in one another. These two processes occur 
concurrently and shape each other6. 
Forsyth specifically criticized the ‘liberation ecology’ advocated by Peet and Watts for 
allowing a projection of values on marginalized actors, often leading to ‘solutions’ that 
impoverish them7. Wendy Espeland investigated such distortions of the values of local actors 
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within her seminal study of the application of rational choice theories to water management in 
the western United States.8 Yet, such an approach remains rare when scientists turn to water 
management, whether in the industrialized or the developing world. Attention was largely 
paid to the privatization of water services, which lent itself readily to the application of 
Marxist theoretical frameworks9. In this case, the political struggle was addressed as one 
pitting capital against water consumers. It dealt with the commodification of water without 
questioning the power relations embedded in the scientific discourse itself. Much attention 
was paid to local forms of water management and to the efficiency of communal property 
regimes10.. Many case studies were explored in depth through an actor based approach that 
sought to highlight how power relations manifest themselves in terms of the physical 
environment11. Yet, very little attention was paid to the social construction of water sciences 
and water technology within the politics of water management. Most social scientists 
respected the scientific ‘facts’ concerning water as an unquestioned evidence, as an objective 
reality to be accounted with. This was challenged somewhat within a historically limited 
focus linked to the construction and the impact of the European Water Framework 
Directive12. Yet, minimum flow requirements, water quality indicators, biodiversity, sewage 
systems deserve more attention from this perspective. Why do we follow such requirements 
or indicators? Why do we resort to such technologies rather than to others? They may 
presently be put forward as neutral tools by those who promote them. Yet they systematically 
embody past compromises, past prioritisations that advantaged some actors over others and 
privileged some methods over others.  
The lack of attention paid to the construction of the dominant water management narrative 
stems partly from the extraordinary difficulty involved in untangling the various mechanisms 
that produced it. The depth provided by a historical analysis over several centuries is priceless 
as it allows us to reconstruct the successive wars of position that led to paradigmatic 
reformulations of water management over time. Investigating infrastructure and its uses while 
harnessing historical methods to unravel the discursive constructions and the power relations 
that are embedded in it, is possible in the case of older canals where a wealth of yet 
unexploited archives allows us to shed light on the manner power relations and science have 
constructed each other over time. Such research serves the double purpose of illuminating a 
case study while allowing advances in the theoretical development of critical political 
ecology. This article, therefore, deploys a political science approach to study what is 
fundamentally a political problem: the construction of collective decisions concerning natural 
resources including their accompanying structures of legitimacy and domination. But this 
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study was made possible only through harnessing historical methods such as triangulating 
information from published work with the content of archives of the unpublished 
deliberations that led to those publications.  
While French historians and political scientists have tended to exploit the archives of the state 
corps of engineers, we turned to the yet unexploited archives of non state actors, such as the 
‘Délibérations de la Chambre de Commerce de Toulouse’ from 1802 to the beginning of the 
twentieth century. This allowed to reassess the construction of the scientific discourse 
concerning water and to reveal the crucial role played by non state actors since the early 
nineteenth century. It confirmed Forsyth’s thesis, according to which the scientific discourse 
cannot be considered independently from the political struggle concerning natural resources. 
It nuances the dominant French narrative portraying water development as a state monopoly 
up to very recent times. 
This article explores the case of the Neste Canal completed in 1862 in the South West of 
France to improve navigation on the tributaries of the Garonne, the third largest flow of all 
French rivers. It examines the mechanisms whereby both its use and the discursive 
construction accompanying it evolved over the last century and contribute today to justify the 
construction of the Charlas Dam. As this paper follows a political science approach, it doesn’t 
provide a detailed chronology in the manner historians might have chosen to do. It discusses 
in depth the periods corresponding to turning points when the hegemonic concepts were 
shaped. It is based, however, on the comprehensive reading of the entire ‘Registre des 
Délibérations de la Chambre de Commerce de Toulouse’ meticulously kept throughout the 
nineteenth century once the chamber of commerce was re-established in 1802 following the 
French Revolution. It is also based on the comprehensive reading of the archives concerning 
the Neste Canal held at the Departmental Archives in Toulouse. This was completed with 
reading the archives of the Ponts et Chaussées concerning the Neste Canal. 
Creating a water supply in the nineteenth century led to the construction of a water deficit in 
the twenty-first century. The advent of a 28 km long canal, with an initial flow of 2 cubic 
meters a second eventually generated the need for a 110 million cubic meters reservoir. 
Exploring the filiation of this infrastructure sheds light on the subtle manner supply 
management generates an ever increasing demand for water. These mechanisms lie in the 
paradigmatic formulation of the management issues. They stem from a discursive process 
deeply embedded in power relations. This article first explores the mechanisms that led to the 
construction of the Neste Canal in 1862.  It then details the evolution of its insertion in the 
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social and political constellation. Finally, it explores the manner in which this canal now 
participates in legitimising a large infrastructure project, the Charlas Dam. 
The importance of state corps of engineers such as the Ponts et Chaussées have often led 
researchers to explore the archives of such corps when studying the development of French 
infrastructure. This may have contributed to a certain underestimation of the role played in 
this domain by actors other than the state. Picon, for example, reported that the French state 
benefited from the 18th century onward from a quasi-monopoly in the domain of 
transportation infrastructure, including canals.13 Guillerme analysed the development of 
canals and roads by the Ponts et Chaussées as a reticulation policy designed by the state to 
control the entire territory.14 The case study explored in this article reveals the fundamental 
role played by an array of non-state actors in the development of the Neste Canal and other 
related infrastructure since its very origin in the early nineteenth century. Although we cannot 
generalise from one case study, the evidence provided by historical methods here lead us to 
question the usual portrayal of the development of water infrastructure in France as a typical 
Weberian bureaucratic process until the 1980s. Harnessing such an approach to study other 
case studies in France could reveal an overall history of water development that is much more 
complex and involves a great number of actors simultaneously competing to impose the 
scientific evidence and the technological solutions and to secure their control. 
 The use of the Neste Canal evolved over the last century, arguably, according to the 
actors who implemented these changes, on the basis of a productive logic. Archives and 
interviews of such actors allow the analysis of their narratives. This article locates their 
decisions and their positions within the social and political constellation in which they were 
functioning. This avoids writing a Whig history of the infrastructure, i.e. accounting for the 
past from the perspective of the present and portraying the successive constructions as 
technical solutions to objective needs.  This approach allows us to identify three types of 
mechanisms participating in the construction of a water deficit now deemed to justify the 
construction of the Charlas dam. The first type of mechanism lies in the social construction of 
water science and technology. The second lies in the evolution of power relations among the 
state and other actors. The third lies in the insertion of the ‘expert’ within these power 
relations. These three types of mechanisms do not constitute an exhaustive list, but they 
provide an insight in the manner infrastructure seems to procreate independently from the 
users’ and builders’ will. They allow us to identify the successive paradigmatic shifts that now 
allow both the proponents and the opponents of dam construction to harness the 
environmental discourse. 
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The Neste Canal 
Undertaken by the French state in 1848, the Neste Canal became operable in 1863 (Figure 1).
It carried water from a perennial tributary of the Garonne, the Neste River, in Sarrancolin, to 
the Lannemezan Plateau, where most of the Gascon water courses spring out. This 
transformed these intermittent tributaries of the Garonne into perennial streams.  
This infrastructure was designed to include five technical components15: 
 1- A navigable channel to carry water from Sarrancolin through the Lannemezan 
Plateau to a reservoir built at the top of the Save and Gers basins. Once on the plateau, this 
channel split into two branches, one of which reached up to the Baïse, 
 2- The Lannemezan Plateau reservoir 
 3- A canal that extended from the channel through the plateau to St-Martory 
 4- A canal that extended from St-Martory to Toulouse intended both for navigation 
and irrigation 
 5- The canalization of the Baïse River to improve its navigability. 
Legend: 
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Figure 1 : Map of a portion of the Garonne river watershed, including the main canals.
The official Ponts et Chaussées project document written by Montet in 1841 claimed to 
pursue three goals:
 “1- The establishment of navigable waterways that would be impossible without the 
recourse to foreign waters; 
 2- The irrigation of lands which the ardent southern sun burns every year; 
 3- The development of factories that are prevented from establishing themselves in 
southern secondary valleys because the seasonal disappearance of water would force them to 
stand still regularly”16.  
 Once operational in 1863, the canal carried 2 cubic meters of water per second, as opposed to 
the expected 7 cubic meters. In 1886, a decree ensured half of that flow must be set aside for a 
set of 8 navigable watercourses linked to the Baïse river. Indeed, the primary goal of the canal 
was navigation. Montet himself remains unequivocal about this in his project document: “The 
Canal that will bring the Pyrénées’ water to the Garonne’s plains, if it was only devoted to 
irrigation, would no doubt never be built; the state alone can undertake such a project and the 
state would not have undertaken it.”17. The flow of the canal was later increased to seven 
cubic meters per second in 1909 and to 14 cubic meters per second in 1952, shortly before the 
creation of the Compagnie d’Aménagement des Coteaux de Gascogne (CACG). This 
corresponded to a change in the use of the infrastructure and to the progressive appearance of 
new actors.  
In the 1950s, the state embarked on a national programme of improving irrigation through the 
development of water infrastructure18  It created sociétés d’économie mixte such as the CACG
and granted them concessions for developing irrigation at the regional scale. The state policy 
of subsidizing 90 percent of the CACG’s operational costs receded after 1972 and disappeared 
totally in 1991. Investments are still highly subsidized, although their overall volume has 
decreased. Crucially, the sources of funding have evolved as 95% are now channelled by 
Conseils Régionaux and Conseils Généraux, respectively regional and departmental elected 
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bodies, rather than by the central state. A different set of considerations now determine the 
price of water and decisions concerning future investments.  
A Whig history of the Neste Canal might portray this long evolution as a series of technical 
improvements, as a tale of progress and development. Yet, a careful scrutiny of the events 
reveals a harsh struggle at every stage among actors with competing goals and interests. 
While they systematically put forward arguments pertaining to a productive logic such as 
improving trade, agricultural production or environmental protection, their strategies were 
largely determined by a variety of other stakes. These are examined in the following section. 
The power struggles that determined the outcome of every decision along this path 
contributed to the changing relations among the various actors. These are analysed in the next 
section. These struggles also participated in the determination of what was expert knowledge 
and who was an expert. More crucially, they contributed to shaping the insertion of the 
“experts” within decision making mechanisms. This is analysed in the last section 
The social construction of water science and technology 
Science and technology are a political and social construct. Theories and techniques never 
become dominant because they were objectively the most logical or the most accurate. They 
rise to hegemonic status when the social groups that promote them become dominant19. Any 
understanding of the ‘development of water’ must entail the exploration of the mechanisms 
whereby water sciences, technologies and management were constructed. The history of the 
Neste Canal reveals the links between the original rationale for the construction of the canal, 
the development of irrigation, the sudden increase in maize production, the development of 
the minimum flow requirement as the crucial environmental indicator, and the present 
construction of the inevitability of the Charlas dam. The social and political struggles over 
each of these issues led to a series of paradigmatic reframing that eventually showed the 
construction of a dam as the only solution to cater for a derived demand for water. In other 
words, science and technology were largely constructed by social and political power 
relations. Yet, conversely, the present scientific discourse and technology largely limits the 
power struggles that can now take place. 
The origins of the Neste Canal 
M. Montet, chief engineer of the Ponts et Chaussées at the ministry of infrastructure, designed 
the present Neste Canal. His project aimed to “detain those waters of the Neste that exceed the 
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needs of its shores and flow by, wasted for all, and bring them on the Lannemezan Plateau in 
order to distribute them, at an opportune time, over all of the sub Pyrenean region where their 
need is felt for navigation, for irrigation and for the movement of industry.”20. The state 
funded this construction. To the Chambre de Commerce of Toulouse (CCT), this represented 
the first concrete step turning a forty year old project into reality. 
Established on 24 December 1802, following the law that recreated the Chambres de 
Commerce in France’s bigger cities after the revolution, the Chambre de Commerce of 
Toulouse devoted its efforts preponderantly to the issues of canals over the course of its first 
year of existence. It protested vehemently to the Ministry of Interior against the proposal 
made by the mayors of Moissac and Montauban to build a canal extending from Toulouse to 
Moissac. 21. It published a mémoire in 300 copies arguing that the Garonne was absolutely 
navigable between Toulouse and Moissac,that only minor works needed to be carried out on 
its banks to maximise the safety of the ships travelling along its course. The mémoire insists 
on a productive logic within its arguments: two thirds of the shipwrecks occur between 
Moissac and Bordeaux, the cost of shipping would become prohibitive on such a canal, and 
most of the shipwrecks between Toulouse and Moissac are due to collisions with floating 
mills that can be removed by virtue of an unenforced law22.  They contend that the proposed 
canal would be both useless and extremely expensive for the public treasury. They add that 
the project of a canal linking Bayonne to Toulouse would be extremely beneficial as it would 
allow communication with Spain. 
While the arguments above all reflect a productive logic based on sound scientific evidence, a 
strategic logic emerges from the unpublished deliberations of the CCT. Comparing this logic 
with the one that was officially put forward within the CCT’s publications allows to better 
appreciate why certain scientific facts were considered rather than others. The Canal du Midi 
had been completed from Toulouse to the Mediterranean harbour of Sète by 1681. Toulouse 
then developed an advantageous commercial position as a necessary warehouse where the 
larger boats travelling on the Canal du Midi must discharge their goods before they were 
loaded onto smaller embarkations capable of travelling on the Garonne River. The CCT 
aimed first and foremost to maintain this advantageous position for Toulouse. Extending the 
canal to another city or town would have caused the entire shipping and warehouse industry to 
move there. Such a project, which would be based on the observation that the Garonne was 
not navigable, threatened deeply the Toulousan economy. Determining the navigability of the 
Garonne River was, therefore, a politically laden issue. Simultaneously, Toulouse wanted an 
extension of the Canal du Midi that would reach Bayonne. This would allow for trade routes 
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that avoided Bordeaux, Moissac and Montauban altogether, a prospect that could only please 
Toulouse merchants.  
While the CCT members write their concerns explicitly in the confidential minutes of their 
meetings, they usually prefer brandishing scientific arguments that will oppose scientific 
evidence to their opponents when they face actors threatening their privileged position. This 
leads the CCT to privilege some measurements and observations over others. This approach 
appears explicitly in 1821, when the CCT insists on two points. First, it lobbies for the 
extension of the proposed canal to the confluence of the Tarn and the Garonne instead of to 
Montauban to prevent its replacing Toulouse as the “warehouse of the Canal du Midi”. 
Second, it insists that the proposed canal be a class 2 canal, cheaper, smaller and only capable 
of accommodating embarkations that could travel on the Garonne. As it wouldn’t 
accommodate the larger boats that travelled on the Canal du Midi, Toulouse could keep 
playing its crucial warehouse role in the transport between the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Atlantic Ocean23. It would remain the home of a thriving shipping industry. 
The navigability of the Garonne River, supposedly an objective, neutral measurement of a 
technological possibility, was highly disputed between Moissac, Montauban and Toulouse for 
commercial reasons. The ‘blackboxing’ of a scientific claim refers to the collective process 
that transforms it into an unquestioned scientific fact24. The ‘blackboxing’ of the Garonne’s 
navigability was a harsh struggle that extended over several decades. It officially pitted 
statistics and scientific observations against each other. But these were formulated to suit the 
interests of specific parties25. The CCT lost a first round as the Conseil d’Etat approved the 
construction of the lateral canal in 1832. But it won in the long term when it succeeded in 
obtaining that this canal be only a class 2 canal. 
The struggle to avoid the construction of the canal to Moissac was enmeshed with a 
concurrent one to “complete the Canal of the Two Seas”. Riquet’s initial idea was to link the 
Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. The CCT championed extending the Canal du Midi 
from Toulouse to Bayonne. In its 1808 meeting with Emperor Napoleon, this was its only 
request. Portraying that stretch of land as extremely fertile, they told Napoleon that “This 
canal would create men and wealth that will never exist without it, the imperial navy could 
benefit from the best masts and the best construction wood…”26 They expected a cost of 20 
millions ‘only’ which triggered Napoleon’s enquiry whether the revenue of the canal would 
amount to 300000 franks. The members of the Chambre de Commerce answered an 
unambiguous “yes”, but took care to mention in their record of this meeting that the canal 
would bring about an increase in the activities that would eventually allow the generation of 
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such revenue. Such certainties on the part of the Chambre de Commerce members concerning 
the project costs, and more generally its finalised status, surprises for. Indeed, only two 
months earlier, they were writing to the Préfet of the Gers asking whether he could search his 
office for the blueprints concerning the canal to Bayonne that had been established in 1785 by 
Messire de La Chapelle.27 The Préfet had been unable to locate the documents.28
 The systematic reference to a Canal of the Two Seas instead of to a Toulouse Bayonne Canal 
is part of a construction of inevitability that is essential for the advent of any infrastructure29. 
In this case, it portrays the Canal du Midi as an incomplete project. The CCT systematically 
cultivated the memory of Riquet to recall its version of his initial goal. It achieved this in a 
variety of ways such as the ceremony it held to mark the reception of Riquet’s medal on 29 
April 182730.  
Once Galabert, a free lance, seat of the pants engineer who was neither a member of the state 
corps or a graduate of a civil engineering school, published in 1830 the project of a canal that 
would take its source in the Neste, carry water both along the Pyrénées up to the Bec du Gave, 
near Bayonne, and to Toulouse, the CCT became his keenest ally. It wrote to the Minister of 
Interior that this canal would create immense wealth, noting that “via easy irrigation, arid 
plains would be transformed into fresh and rich meadows, the product of which are less 
sensitive than others to the vagrancies of the climate.”31. When Galabert, who had by then 
managed to be elected as deputy of the Gers, informed the CCT of the Conseil d’Etat’s 
decision to approve the lateral canal, the CCT sent him 600 copies of its 1831 mémoire to 
distribute to the legislative assembly, and rallied many other chambers of commerce to its 
efforts. Clear alliances emerged between actors pursuing very different goals, but sharing an 
interest in a specific definition of the Garonne’s navigability and in the construction of a canal 
from Toulouse to Bayonne32,.  These alliances allowed a specific “scientific” discourse to 
prevail concerning these issues. 
Galabert died in 1841, ruined by his ambitious, failed project. So when the CCT examined 
Montet’s project of a Neste canal the same year, it perceived it as a partial fulfilment of 
Galabert’s project, a subsidized first section of the canal to Bayonne. In his report on this new 
project, Arnoux notes “If Galabert’s canal was to be executed in its entirety by speculators, 
the navigation tax would be sizeable, these taxes would be based on the importance of the 
capital invested in its construction; the taxes would need to cover the interest payments of that 
capital, but would also need to cover the maintenance and the operation costs. The portion 
that the government will build cannot cause an expensive tax because the State must not 
speculate.”33 The Chambre de Commerce perceives this project as a subsidized first section of 
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the canal to Bayonne it has wanted for so long. The project became even more attractive once 
the Chemins de Fer du Midi, a private railroad company, acquired a concession on the canal 
lateral in 1852 and a lease on the Canal du Midi in 185834. It practiced a tarification for 
navigation on these channels that was competitive with rail transport. The CCT fought this 
tarification for decades, arguing that the low added value of the area’s products, maize and 
timber essentially, meant that this high transport cost was prohibitive to their exportation35. 
Improving navigation on the Baïse, where no tariff could be exercised because it was a natural 
water course became even more attractive to the CCT. The Neste Canal was thus not only a 
first step in the realisation of the Toulouse-Bayonne Canal, it was also useful in the short-term 
because it could supply the Baise river system with a permanent flow of water that would 
allow navigation and therefore avoid the unacceptable tariffs levied on  the canals. 
While the proponents of the Neste Canal were only concerned with navigation, they harnessed 
irrigation to further their cause. “Over one hundred thousand hectares of land desiccated by 
the rays of a scorching sun will receive the fertilizing water of the Garonne. This water, 
carried to the top of hills, will transform our arid plains into rich pastures. Then, butcher’s 
meat, the expense of which presently deprives the labouring class from a food so necessary to 
the sustenance of physical forces, will certainly decrease in price. Cattle, that is lacking to the 
work of the ploughman, will multiply in the great properties…”36. Yet, Montet was 
unequivocal about the irrelevance of irrigation to his project. Still, the discourse on irrigation 
was reiterated for decades and later largely shaped the narrative of water management in the 
area. It allowed portraying the canal as serving the public good. 
The construction of the Neste Canal resulted from a combination of commercial interests that 
led the merchants of Toulouse to strive to preserve their advantage acquired in 1681 over 
Montauban and Moissac by championing the extension of the Canal du Midi to Bayonne. This 
process included the blackboxing of the navigability of the Garonne River in order to defeat 
the project of the Lateral Canal to Moissac or Montauban and their allying with Louis 
Galabert when he undertook the vast project of the Canal des Pyrénées as a private venture he 
attempted to fund via private subscriptions. Throughout the nineteenth century, proponents of 
canals systematically added to their pile of arguments the value of their projects for irrigation 
over thousands of hectares, claiming the fertility of land without either studying it, surveying 
the area involved or even consulting the farmers. This contrasted with their elaborate 
calculations of infrastructure costs and ensuing navigation taxes compared with the costs of 
transport by rail. 
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Corps such as the Ponts et Chaussées started developing profitability or efficiency 
calculations to judge the opportunity of infrastructure projects in the second half of the 18th
century. They held that they appropriated the values of public utility, universality and 
impartiality.37 Calculating the utility of a project therefore served to demonstrate their 
rectitude, in principle. The evidence provided by the archives shows that they chose the 
numbers rather arbitrarily to support their values. The construction process through the 
nineteenth century produced the infrastructure of the Neste Canal as well as a series of  
blackboxed ‘scientific facts’. These included the issue of navigability and irrigation. This 
discursive process erected irrigation as a necessary development that would enrich the area. 
Yet, this discourse was constructed entirely by social actors who neither practiced nor 
invested in irrigation. 
The emergence of irrigation 
While a specific configuration of power relations in the nineteenth century, structured 
essentially around the stakes of trade and navigation, produced the infrastructure of the Neste 
Canal and a discourse promoting irrigation, other mechanisms explain the advent of the 
practice of irrigation itself. These include the interventionist approach of the French state after 
the Second World War to promote irrigation and maize cultivation, but they also include 
international influences via the Marshall Plan and the Common Agricultural Policy of the 
European Union. A set of power relations led irrigated maize to become the predominant 
factor in the construction of a water deficit that now justifies the Charlas Dam.  
Maize in the South West of France 
  Introduced in the South West of France from Spain in the 15th century, maize long appeared 
as a suspicious plant reserved for animal feed because of its reputation for spreading diseases. 
Yet, more resistant than other crops, it could feed humans in time of crisis.38 At the time when 
the Chambre de Commerce de Toulouse strives actively to obtain a navigation canal to 
Bayonne, it also successively reports excess of maize for which no demand exists in France. 
In 1803, it asks permission from the Ministry of Interior to sell this maize in Spain and 
Corsica, explaining that the crop was very good but no one in France wants to buy such a 
product, so maize “rots” in the granaries.39 It renews such a request a year later for identical 
reasons.40
The overall improvement in productivity in agriculture throughout the nineteenth century 
reduced the importance of maize as the ‘insurance policy’ in case other crops failed. Its 
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production dropped steadily in France, from 600,000 cultivated hectares in 1840 to 300,000 
hectares in the 1930s. By 1900, maize was increasingly imported from French colonies such 
as Madagascar and Indochina. In 1930, the Compagnie de Chemins de Fer du Sud-Ouest 
organised the first international conference on maize in Pau hoping an increased production 
would fuel a demand for its service41. The fact a railroad company convened this conference 
highlights the inexistence of any organised community of maize growers. The Association 
Générale des Producteurs de Maïs (AGPM) emerged in 1934 largely as a result of the Pau 
conference. 
The Marshall Plan, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the United Nations 
Reconstruction and Recovery Administration (UNRRA) introduced hybrid varieties of maize 
in France, following the Second World War, allowing higher productivity per hectare42. The 
USA aimed essentially to balance its accounts and wasn’t so much aiming to make French 
agriculture dependent on American seeds as it was trying to transform it into an export sector 
that could fund imports from American industries. French farmers resisted adopting American 
hybrid maize because such seeds only produce one crop of high yield cereals. Farmers must 
buy seeds again for the next crop. Such dependence clashed with the traditional practices of 
French peasantry43.  
The French state reacted quickly to this sudden intrusion of American hybrids. It created the 
Institut National de Recherche Agronomique (INRA) (not defined earlier, spell out in full 
here) in 1946 to develop agricultural productivity, notably by developing its own brands of 
maize hybrids. The INRA 244 and 258 were thus developed with three goals in mind: 
producing species that would be stable and distinct in order to allow anti-fraud control and an 
intellectual property regime, producing homogeneous species to allow for mechanisation and 
producing species that reacted well to fertilisers and pesticides.44 A public establishment, the 
INRA worked hand in hand with private seed suppliers and with activist movements such as 
the Jeunesse Agricole Catholique, represented in the Centre National des Jeunes 
Agricultueurs (CNJA), an influential group within the Fédération Nationale des Syndicats 
d’Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA), in order to change the identity of the French peasantry so it 
would perceive itself as belonging to a technical profession. This was part and parcel of the 
Gaullist effort to modernise agriculture and free manpower to enter industry and the services. 
It was necessary to persuade farmers to adopt hybrid maize they didn’t want. It also had 
unforeseen consequences on the balance of power between state and professional 
organizations which will be explored in the second part of this article. It eventually 
empowered farmer associations such as the AGPM. 
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After coercing and persuading French farmers to cultivate new crops such as hybrid maize, 
the French state persuaded them to irrigate to improve productivity. The discourse, elaborated 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century, according to which irrigation would enrich the 
area, had become unquestioned by the 1950s, even though it had only been produced as a 
justification to attain other goals. 
The massive cultivation of maize in the South West of France induced a derived demand for 
water, i.e one in which the need for a factor in production derives from the need for the final 
product this factor helps to produce. The focus was placed on the demand for water without 
questioning the construction of the demand for the product this water was producing. When 
irrigating maize was criticised at the beginning of the 21st century, the soaring oil prices 
spurred a new discourse. Biofuel produced from maize would contribute to curb global 
warming. 
The advent of the minimum flow requirement 
The concept of a minimum flow requirement, now blackboxed, plays a crucial role in the 
filiation process linking the Neste Canal and the Charlas Dam. Initially an anthropocentric 
idea, the minimum flow requirement eventually became the crucial environmental indicator 
harnessed to justify constructing the dam. 
Montet’s project detailed an anthropocentric definition of the minimum flow requirement45. 
Only those waters of the Neste that are superfluous to the present and future needs of its 
shores are to be deviated46. These needs clearly did not include the environment. Yet, this 
minimum flow requirement was eventually going to become the pivotal environmental 
indicator for water courses. Over the next century and a half, it was to acquire an ecocentric 
character absent from its initial formulation. The Water Management Master Scheme 
officially adopted by the Adour-Garonne Basin in 1996 for a period of validity lasting until 
2009, adopted the following definition ‘The minimum flow requirement is the flow value 
determined by the Water Management Master Scheme: 
- above which the normal co-existence of all uses and the healthy function of the 
aquatic environment are guaranteed, 
- which must thus be guaranteed every year during the low water period, with tolerances 
defined in table c1’47
The construction of water indicators shows three phases. The identification of a characteristic 
is first generated by the use of the resource48. In the Neste case, the capacity of a watercourse 
to allow navigation was defined in 1841 as the most important characteristic; ie its flow. As 
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the watercourses of the plateau were intermittent, the second phase of the construction of the 
indicator, the measurement of that property, could only consist of setting an artificial target to 
be reached thanks to infrastructure that would alter the natural flow. This occurred because a 
set of actors with specific interests were producing these definitions. Finally, the third phase 
of indicator construction, the transformation of this measured property into a variable within a 
model, was achieved by those who managed the infrastructure. Once an indicator is 
established within a predominant discourse, its users forget the specific options that generated 
it in the first place49. This certainly was the fate of the minimum flow requirement in the river 
system fed by the Neste Canal. 
The 1984 law set minimum flow requirements within rivers and downstream of dams to at 
least one tenth of the average yearly flow. The minimum flow requirement became the basic 
environmental indicator for a watercourse. As the watercourses of the Lannemezan Plateau 
are intermittent, setting a minimum flow requirement entailed the construction and 
maintenance of reservoirs. Since 1979, the overall use of water over the entire basin has 
decreased but the irrigation of maize has increased the withdrawal at the time of low water50. 
The problem is not defined as an overall lack of water but rather as a problematic seasonal 
distribution, so a dam offers the ideal solution to alter this distribution.  Respecting the 
environmental discourse and respecting the irrigation demand now apparently converge in 
requesting the construction of more dams. Initially, these appeared to satisfy sectoral interests, 
such as irrigation or power generation. The advent of the minimum flow requirement as the 
crucial environmental indicator allowed the emergence of ecological dam construction. A 
wide ranging set of actors could all harness the environmental discourse as it matched their 
interests. By advocating the respect of the minimum flow requirement, farmers could request 
the Charlas Dam to protect the environment and, incidentally, supply the additional water 
required at peak times, dam builders could claim to build dams in order to protect the 
environment, and the state could justify building a tool that maintained some control in its 
hands within the post-1981 decentralization era. Such a rallying around the environmental 
discourse has been observed elsewhere, in developing countries where attention was more 
readily paid to the multitude of actors, apart from the state, that determine the management of 
environmental resources51. The Neste case demonstrates such a phenomenon also occurs in 
industrialized countries. 
The Scientific Council advising the Comité de Bassin Adour-Garonne questioned the validity 
of the minimum flow requirement as the essential environmental indicator in 1998. It failed to 
reopen this black box, however. Such were the clash of interests between this scientific 
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enquiry concerning the best environmental health indicator and the actors who relied on the 
hegemony of the minimum flow requirement to further their strategies that the Comité ceased 
to take advice from the Scientific Council. Closure was reached and the concept of the 
minimum flow requirement was black boxed for the next foreseeable future. This constituted 
an important step in the construction of inevitability of the Charlas Dam. 
Paradigmatic reformulations 
While the project of the Charlas Dam exists since the 1970s, when the French state required 
the CACG to identify all the potential dam sites, this project cannot be portrayed as a simple 
state initiative. It was produced by a series of paradigmatic reformulations that linked 
inexorably the construction of the Neste Canal with that of the Charlas Dam. Interestingly 
enough, the state did not appear as a leading actor within any of these paradigmatic 
reformulations. First, the rivalry between the merchants of Toulouse and those of Moissac and 
Montauban led to the construction of the Neste Canal and its portrayal as serving the public 
interest. This process was closely enmeshed with the definition of the navigability of the 
Garonne River. The reformulation of the merchants’ interests into a requirement of 
infrastructure serving the public interest entailed the propagation of a discourse portraying 
irrigation as serving public interest. This paradigmatic reformulation produced the minimum 
flow requirement initially as an anthropocentric concept. The discourse on the civilizing 
power of irrigation was reproduced for a century before the state actually intervened actively, 
via the creation of the CACG, to bring irrigation water to the farmers’ plots in spite of them 
and free of charge.  
Each of these paradigmatic reformulations of particular interests into public interests and 
afferent infrastructure needs was accompanied with a concomitant scientific construction: the 
navigability of a river in one case and the minimum flow requirement in the other. The latter 
was reformulated in the twentieth century as an ecocentric concept and harnessed within the 
environmentalist discourse. These reformulations, where technology and science have 
contributed to each other’s construction, constitute the first type of filiation mechanisms 
linking the Neste Canal and the Charlas Dam. Indeed, once a discourse had become 
hegemonic, for example, once all actors needed to justify their strategy as furthering the 
necessary development of irrigation, or furthering the necessary protection of the aquatic 
environment, their degree of freedom was consequently constrained by this discourse. 
The evolution of power relations among the state and other actors 
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Traditionally, French studies of public policy integrated the Weberian hypothesis of a state 
bureaucracy formulating top down policies and implementing them through sectorial 
departments. The French water law of 3 January 1992 set up an optional participation of a set 
of actors in the elaboration of water policies. It called for ‘concertation’, a participatory 
process, via Commissions Locales de l’Eau (CLE) as the institution in charge of elaborating a 
Schéma d’Aménagement et de Gestion de l’Eau within a basin (SAGE). This led to a 
reconsideration of this state centric approach, but only to examine the period following the 
decentralisation act of 1981 and the water act of 199252,.  Yet, the state was not an initiator of 
infrastructure policies through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It reacted to 
private sector initiatives which led it to experiment with private public partnerships 
institutionalised as companies before the Second World War53. The first section of this article 
demonstrated that the Weberian hypothesis of a top down formulation of state policies 
concerning water certainly does not apply through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
within our case study. Both the decisions to build infrastructure, the Neste Canal and its 
accompanying reservoirs, and the accompanying discourses to legitimise and change its uses, 
resulted from a great variety of competitions and co-operations among a set of actors active 
over widely differing scalar levels. The state appears in this narrative only as a powerful actor 
among many. It wasn’t the initiator either of the discourses or of the infrastructure plans in the 
nineteenth century. It posed as the driver of social engineering to transform a peasant society 
into an entrepreneurial agricultural society after the Second World War. But it did so very 
much as a reaction to external decisions, such as those made by the United States within the 
Marshall Plan, and within the narrow rails constructed by the discourse that emerged as part 
and parcel of the infrastructure in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Furthermore, the 
“new approach” announced by the 1991 law is one of “concertation”, a participatory process, 
as opposed to negotiation. It postulates the existence of an objective public good that will be 
reached if actors discuss sufficiently. It ignores the fact that the definition of a public good is 
a discursive construction that results from the strategies of heterogeneous actors once they 
emerge as dominant. The idea of irrigation furthering the public interest of the south west of 
France is a stark illustration of this as was detailed in the first section of this article. 
The weakness of post-colonial states probably eased the identification of such actor struggles 
within natural resources management in the developing world. Migdal detailed the complex 
compromises developing states had to reach with the many actors exercising social control 
within their borders54. The study of the interaction between such power relations within 
human societies and the environment eventually came to be recognized as political ecology55. 
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This approach focussed on deciphering the power struggles and their accompanying 
discursive constructions in order to shed light on the manner societies interacted with their 
environment56. Significantly, such approaches were initially only used to study developing 
states57. In Europe, the Weberian hypothesis largely prevailed and prevented inductive 
approaches rooted in field observations, interviews and archival work such as is presented in 
the first section of this article. Instead, a deductive approach privileged the study of water 
laws and portrayed public policies largely as top down developments58. 
 Regionalism and decentralisation were often shown as succeeding a period of state 
dominance and the regal character of the French administration was shown as an impediment 
to the “concertation” mechanisms it was attempting to deploy59. Yet, the theoretical body 
produced by studies of cases in developing countries proves very useful to understand the 
Neste situation. 
The nineteenth century saw a fierce battle pitting the engineers of the Ponts et Chaussées and 
independent entrepreneurs such as Galabert to secure a monopoly over large infrastructure 
projects. When the author of the corps’ report on the Neste Canal project recalls all of the 
Ingénieurs en chef who, before Galabert, offered another path for the channel, he is 
constructing the inevitability of both his own project and his corps securing that monopoly60. 
The state limited riparian rights in 1919 and instituted a regime of concession or authorization 
for producing hydroelectricity. The state was thus reacting to private hydropower 
development and was trying to gain control over it.
Dams were built in the Pyrénées at the end of the nineteenth century, upstream from the 
Neste, affecting the supply of the Neste Canal. Once irrigation developed, the schedule of 
water release became crucial. Irrigating farmers didn’t usually need water at the times most 
appropriate for electricity generation. In 1957, Electricité de France (EDF), the national 
electric company, negotiated schedules of water releases for the Neste system with the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Once created, the CACG took over this negotiation role. In 1960, the 
state granted the CACG a concession on a series of dams and irrigation perimeters it was due 
to build.  In 1963, the state allocated the CACG 48 million cubic meters of water at will from 
EDF dams, to distribute free of charge. Between 1972 and 1991, The CACG started selling 
water to cover its high fixed costs. It gains from selling ever more water to the farmers and 
would face bankruptcy if the sales dropped excessively. The state had initially created the 
CACG as its instrument, but by 1991, it had become a relatively independent actor with its 
own stakes and strategies concerning water management in the Neste system. It had forged 
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new alliances with regional and departmental councils, elected public bodies with local 
authority, the power of which increased progressively following the 1981 decentralisation act. 
Irrigation strengthened the AGPM and the various Chambres d’Agricultures that became 
powerful professional associations. Their role now resembles that played by the CCT in the 
nineteenth century. They show no resemblance with the Société d’Agriculture of the 
nineteenth century that strove to educate “backward locals”. The 1964 water law set up 
Comités de Bassin and Agences Financières de Bassin throughout France. The 1992 water 
law required them to develop water management schemes on the basis of concertation with all 
stakeholders. 
The Neste Canal has existed within a hydropolitical constellation that includes a vast array of 
actors deploying strategies over very different scalar levels. These actors evolved over time. 
New ones appeared and others lost their power. But at no time, was the state a monolithic or 
monopolistic actor determining the fate of water management. The changing power relations 
among these actors determined the construction of the management objectives. Initially, water 
was carried to allow navigation and civilizing ‘backward’ areas. This objective changed into 
growing maize to export and generate foreign currency. Later, water had to be supplied so that 
the CACG could remain in business. Now, it is being channelled so that biofuels will curb 
global warming. The changing power relations largely determined the place environment 
occupied within these decisions, the manner problems were perceived and technical solutions 
conceived. Throughout, laws and decrees issued by the state appeared reactively, as tools of 
the state, never as driving forces bringing about fundamental change. 
The Insertion of the Expert within decision making processes 
Throughout the filiation process whereby the Neste Canal spawned the Charlas Dam, “expert 
knowledge” played a significant role. Few individuals were recognized to have the capacity to 
define either public interest, the navigability of the Garonne, a correct indicator for 
environmental health, the best technological choices, the most efficient agricultural practices, 
or the most appropriate crops. Those who benefited from such recognition will be referred to 
here as “the experts”. The first section of this article showed how these issues were shaped by 
numerous power struggles enmeshed with each other over various scales. The second section 
detailed how new actors emerged on the scene as time went by and how the power relations 
among them evolved.  Each actor tried to identify “its” experts to put forward a rational and 
scientific case in line with its own strategy. The mechanisms whereby experts are embedded 
within these power relations and these decision making mechanisms is worth examining. It 
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contributed largely to determine what constituted acceptable, reliable knowledge, what 
constituted progress and development. These mechanisms explain why completely valid 
knowledge was silenced throughout the two centuries of this process. What factors legitimise 
knowledge as valid both in the experts’ eyes and in the eyes of those who listen to them, what 
power is granted to the experts, who pays them, which formal and informal networks they 
belong to, such as, in France, the alumni associations of the “higher schools”, the corps, all 
contribute to determine the mechanisms whereby experts are embedded within power 
relations and decision making within this process. 
The advent of modernity has been described as a specific alliance between the “experts” and 
the state apparatus that emerged between the 17th and 19th century in Western Europe when 
the ruling class progressively changed its role. “Nothing less was required than the acceptance 
of state expertise in the art of living; it had to be admitted that the state and the specialists it 
appointed and legitimized knew better what was good for the subjects, and how they should 
live their lives and beware of acting in a fashion harmful to themselves. The subjects were not 
only denied the ability to find their way to God; they were denied the capacity of living 
human life without the surveillance, assistance and corrective intervention of those in the 
know.”61. This power knowledge syndrome constitutes the most conspicuous aspect of 
modernity.  
By the time Napoléon broke openly with the “ideologists” in 1812, the major engineering 
schools had already been created as institutions of the French state. The Ecole Nationale des 
Ponts et Chaussées alone stemmed back to the old, monarchist regime. The Ecole des Mines 
and the Polytechnique emerged during the revolution. The 1812 divorce between the French 
state and the experts only involved the social sciences. The natural sciences had been 
structured firmly as a branch of the state apparatus. Engineers spent their professional lives in 
either private enterprises or government departments but belonged to “corps” issued from 
their schools. This specific structure within “corps” is part of what led Jean-Jacques Pérennes 
to study “the engineers” as a specific class of social actors within the development of water62. 
The corps ensured a certain homogeneity in the societal options the members adhered to. 
The modern view of the world postulates the existence of universally applicable principles 
governing both the physical and the social world. The post-modern watershed, that 
transformed social sciences in the last thirty years, has scarcely penetrated the natural sciences 
and the engineering world. This results both from the incompatibility of the theoretical 
frameworks and from the alliance between these engineering schools and the state 
apparatuses. Modernity and post-modernity are two sharply different contexts, that can co-
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exist, in which the intellectual role is performed63. This is shaping both the experts’ 
knowledge and their means to transmit this knowledge as valid. This is participating in the 
filiation process linking the Neste Canal and the Charlas Dam because it is contributing to the 
labelling of knowledge as valid and to its being articulated within infrastructure decisions. 
The experts are not necessarily produced within the “Higher Schools”, however. While the 
state used the CCT throughout the nineteenth century as a reservoir of experts on economic 
issues, it only used the Société d’agriculture as a tool to civilise the backward peasants of the 
area. The study published in 1891 by the CCT specifies outright the claim to legitimacy of its 
author: he has, it claims, the practical sense of a merchant who knows how to draw on his 
own professional experience in order to establish, through rational deductions, an excellent 
defence of public interest64. Legitimizing knowledge by invoking its being grounded in 
rationality is typical of modernity. Yet, this statement reveals the social hermeneutics at work 
because it links the attribution of rationality to the social status of the author: a successful 
merchant, i.e a member of the notability.  
Conversely, the Société d’Agriculture was not headed by peasants, but by “experts” such as 
professors of agriculture at the University of Toulouse, physicians and senators. Its yearly 
reports to the préfet, from 1864 on, detail well the insertion of experts within society. It 
received books from the ministry of agriculture to teach the local peasants good agricultural 
practices. It held annual contests to reward those deploying “best practices”. The plowing 
contest was especially used to demonstrate the benefits of mechanization65. In 1894, the 
President of the Agricultural Societé of the Haute-Garonne, also professor at the University of 
Toulouse, travelled to a conference at Oxford to learn from other detainers of recognized 
knowledge grounded in “rationality”. Yet, he doesn’t seem to have ever visited Prades, in the 
Oriental Pyrénées, where he could have learned century old irrigation practices66. The 
knowledge and experience developed by the Prade peasants could not be ascribed to 
rationality because of their social status. It seemed preferable to count on Oxford experts to 
learn about irrigation in the South of France. 
The opinion voiced by the experts concerning the peasants they were supposed to civilise 
appears clearly in the nineteenth century documents. In 1840, a mémoire from the Ponts et 
Chaussées defends the project of the Neste Canal thus: 
“[…]we would soon see the moors that still cover it converted into rich and fertile plains; and 
its population, rare and in a state of first nature, so to say, grow and rise, through its contact 
with the more advanced populations, to the same level of civilization as the rest of France.” 67
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Such a paradigmatic definition of valid knowledge prevented the recognized experts from 
acquiring any knowledge from the peasants in the area. Thus, when the municipal councils of 
these “backward” villages reacted in 1901 to plans for a new regulation of the pricing of 
irrigation water, their observations were not taken into account. Their objections covered the 
flow of water necessary to irrigate one hectare, the irrigation calendar, the proposed price of 
water compared to the monetary yield per hectare, the poverty of the local soil, its being water 
logged in the spring, which renders irrigation useless for hay production. All such 
observations were drawn from their professional experience on the basis of rational 
deductions. But their social status prevented any recognition of that rationality. 
Experts were never entirely embedded within state structures, either. Galabert was not a 
member of any corps, but his project very much informed that of Montet. Experts seem to 
have been most deeply embedded in state apparatuses during the three decades following the 
Second World War, when water was brought to the farmers by the CACG in 1952 free of 
charge because they didn’t want it. Even then, the ministry within which an expert was 
embedded would greatly determine whether his scientific claim would eventually be 
transformed into a scientific fact. Experts could rely on their informal networks to cut across 
ministerial compartmentalization but this remained an arduous task. 
The decentralization act of 1981 and the Water Act of 1992 led to the creation of new 
institutions that also hire engineers either directly or via the recourse to consultant firms. The 
manner in which experts are now embedded has thus been altered. Their legitimacy to coerce 
lesser beings in accepting the consequences of their judgement was grounded in their 
purported ability to define the public interest. Now that experts are working for regional or 
departmental bodies instead of national ones, their claim to formulate the public interest is 
being eroded. Most of them subscribe to a paradigm steeped in modernity and adhere 
wholeheartedly to principles they deem to have universal applicability. But their employers 
may not share their vision altogether. 
The experts played a key role in the filiation process between the Neste Canal and the Charlas 
Dam. They served to legitimize the knowledge that was put forward within a productive logic. 
Who was recognized as an expert, however, depended on social processes that prevented 
much knowledge from being harnessed. Who hired the expert, on the other hand, largely 
determined the resonance of his scientific claim. The fate of the scientific council which used 
to advise the Comité de Bassin Adour-Garonne illustrates this starkly. 
The soaring oil prices until the middle of 2008 have created a new rapprochement among 
some of the experts. The fuel produced from maize became competitive with petrol. This 
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brought about an increase in the price of maize on the world market. In 2007, maize irrigating 
farmers generated profit even without EU subsidies and thus express an increased demand for 
water. The ecologists concerned with climate change approve the replacement of fossil fuel 
with one that generates a new carbon sink with the next crop. The CACG can only approve all 
this as its viability depends on the quantity of water it supplies. Construction firms can now 
claim the dams they build not only maintain the minimum flow requirement necessary to 
preserve the local ecosystem, they now also allow solving the biggest environmental problem 
at the global scale: climate change. This convergence of interests among the actors in which 
experts are now embedded is contributing to the promotion of a specific technology, biofuel, 
and to the silencing of other technologies such as the hydrogen fuel cell. These technologies 
are not being compared on the basis of their relative merits and demerits. The scientific 
discourse is harnessed by actors who have specific stakes in the promotion of a certain 
technology or scientific claim. This occurred for the definition of the navigability of the 
Garonne in the nineteenth century, which eventually allowed the construction of the Neste 
Canal. It is now occurring for the promotion of biofuel, which is now the strongest argument 
supporting the construction of the Charlas Dam. As the basin only consumes 60% of its 
renewable water resources over the course of a year, dams allow the summer consumption 
necessary to grow maize. 
CONCLUSION 
Do canals spawn dams? They seem to do so in subtle ways. Their material construction is 
necessarily accompanied by that of a scientific discourse that blackboxes facts and 
technologies. These hegemonic concepts arise thanks to wars of position, in the Gramscian 
sense, that later allow wars of movement whereby new powerful actors emerge and strike new 
alliances. Their struggles require them to co-opt ‘experts’ in a variety of ways, which 
channels the evolution of the scientific discourse further. Such mechanisms, illustrated by the 
Neste Canal, seem to occur globally. Intellectuals or academics in the United States have been 
shown to tend not to be dissenters or radicals, but rather quite conformists68. The mechanisms 
whereby the fate of their work is embedded in power struggles contribute to explain this. 
The Neste Canal was built because of the commercial rivalry between Toulouse, Moissac, 
Montauban and Bordeau. The social construction of science and technology that formed an 
integral part of its physical construction included the navigability of the Garonne, the 
development of hybrid maize, its irrigation and the minimum flow requirement as the basic 
indicator of the environmental health of rivers. Its construction was part and parcel of the 
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changing power relations among the various actors active in the basin. This led to the 
unforeseen emergence of very powerful farmer organisations and to a management institution, 
the CACG, that thrives on selling more water and would collapse if irrigation decreased 
excessively. Its construction and its management contributed to the evolution of the manner 
experts were embedded within the power relations among the various actors active in the 
basin. This narrowed the environmental discourse disproportionately to the consideration of 
the minimum flow requirement and biofuels at the expense of other, scientifically sound, 
indicators and technologies. These three types of mechanisms constructed the inevitability of 
the Charlas Dam. The filiation between the Neste Canal and the Charlas Dam may be 
complex, but remains undeniable.  
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